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In this article I attempt to elucidate the psycholinguistic 
mechanics of Swain’s “output hypothesis.” Taking the 
information processing approach as a starting point and 
relating that to Levelt’s model of language production and 
Anderson’s learning theory, I argue that output serves an 
important role in second language acquisition, in particu­
lar because it generates highly specific input the cognitive 
system needs to build up a coherent set of knowledge. 
Output also plays a direct role in enhancing fluency by 
turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge. 
Output can also play an indirect role in the acquisition of 
declarative knowledge by triggering input that the learner 
can use for the generation of new declarative knowledge. 
On the basis of an analysis of think-aloud protocols, I 
hypothesize that the locus of the effect of output is in the 
transition of declarative to procedural knowledge.
This article resulted from a long discussion with Merrill Swain on the role 
of output. I am very grateful to her for stimulating my interest in this topic. 
I am indebted to her, Theo Bongaerts, and Eric Kellerman for their very 
helpful comments on earlier versions.
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ness Communication Studies, University of Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 
6525 HT Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Internet: u202012@vm.uci.kun.nl
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A number of publications have proposed the “output hy­
pothesis” as an important extension of theories that consider 
input as the most important aspect of foreign/second language 
acquisition (SLA) (Pica, Holliday, Lewis, & Morgenthaler, 1989; 
Swain, 1985). Although the output hypothesis is appealing, 
and although experienced language teachers (and learners) 
will immediately recognize its validity, researchers have not 
treated in much detail the psycholinguistic mechanics of the 
role of output in acquisition. This paper is a first attempt to 
analyze a number of examples presented as evidence for output 
as learning in terms of processing. The emphasis is on word 
knowledge in a broad sense: that is, including the syntactic 
features that are part of a lexical item. I will discuss output 
data within the framework of the language production model 
developed by Levelt (1989) in an adapted version aimed at 
bilingual processing (de Bot, 1992; de Bot & Schreuder, 1993). 
This article aims not so much to test the output hypothesis 
against other hypotheses put forward in the SLA literature, but 
rather to clarify how input and output play a role in a model of 
SLA in which the information-processing approach is imple­
mented in a psycholinguistic production model.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I present a 
psycholinguistic perspective on what it means to know a word, 
then discuss various functions of output in SLA. In the next part, 
I present two psychological models in the information processing 
tradition, Levelt’s (1993) language production model and 
Anderson’s (1982) ACT* learning theory. I attempt to explain the 
various functions of output in terms of these models.
What Is Lexical Knowledge ?
There are a number of different approaches for defining what 
constitutes mastery of a word. Nation (1990) presented a list of
aspects that a learner has to acquire about a specific word, 
including different aspects of meaning, associations, collocations, 
grammatical patterns in which a word can appear, frequency of
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use, and orthography. Nation’s list is a complete list of all the 
aspects that make up the knowledge of a word.
Another approach is to start from the information the lan­
guage-processing system needs in order to function: What types of 
information must be available for the system to be able to perceive 
and produce language? A growing body of psycholinguistic re­
search has treated how lexical knowledge functions as part of the 
language-processing system, and how we can deduce from that 
what information the learner has to acquire in order to be able to 
use language (cf. various papers in a special issue of Cognition on 
Lexical Access in Language Production, 1993, and in Schreuder & 
Weltens, 1993). In the present article I discuss lexical knowledge 
and lexical skills in terms of these kinds of processing models. I 
take as a starting point and discuss lexical knowledge in terms of 
the models.
This approach clearly has consequences for what we mean by 
“acquisition.” The SLA research literature is not always clear on 
how acquisition is defined (cf. R. Ellis 1994, p. 15). It can refer to 
the acquisition of new linguistic features but also to changes in the 
processing of existing knowledge. The criteria set for acquisition 
depend on the theoretical framework used. As I shall describe 
later, a clear demarcation between new and existing knowledge is 
difficult to make in the model presented here. It conceives of 
acquisition as gradual growth of knowledge structures and an 
increase of the ease with which those structures can be used in 
processing. This implies that acquisition also can be the acquisi­
tion of incomplete rules or wrong word meanings: Acquisition is 
defined not by an external criterion, but largely by the extension 
of existing knowledge.
One aspect that I will not deal with is the distinction between 
“implicit” and “explicit” learning of lexical knowledge and skills. 
A full discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of the present 
article. N. C. Ellis (1994) provides an excellent review of work on 
this distinction.
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Input and Output
The input/output controversy has a long history in applied 
linguistics. Swain’s (1985,1995; Swain & Lapkin, 1995) claims for 
a more prominent role for output in SLA are basically a reaction 
to Krashen’s (1982, 1985) monitor theory in which comprehen­
sible input plays a central role, On the basis of her research on 
immersion students who, despite receiving considerable compre­
hensible input, do not seem to acquire native-like productive 
skills, Swain has concluded that input alone is not enough:
The argument, then, is that immersion students do not 
demonstrate native-speaker productive competence, not 
because their comprehensible input is limited but because 
their comprehensible output is limited. It is limited in two 
ways. First, the students are simply not given—especially 
in the later grades—adequate opportunities to use the 
target language in the classroom context. Second, they are 
not being “pushed” in their output. (Swain 1985, p. 249)
In recent publications, Swain (1995) and Swain and Lapkin 
(1995) have discussed four functions of output in SLA. Its first 
function is to make learners aware of gaps in their knowledge, 
“noticing.” Noticing gaps “may trigger cognitive processes which 
might generate linguistic knowledge that is new for the learner, 
or that consolidates their existing knowledge” (Swain, 1995, p. 
126). The second function is to serve language learning through 
hypothesis testing, and the third function is metalinguistic in 
nature: Output serves to control and internalize linguistic knowl­
edge. The fourth function is to enhance fluency through practice.
Previous Research on the Output Hypothesis
A number of studies have aimed to evaluate the output 
hypothesis empirically. Pica et al. (1989) had pairs of native (NSs) 
and nonnative (NNSs) speakers interact in different tasks. The 
aim of the study was to describe how NNSs reacted when the NSs 
indicated that they had difficulty understanding NNSs in tasks 
that differed in the amount and type of information needed. The
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results showed that different tasks and the linguistic demands 
associated with them play a role in the amount and type of 
“pushed output.” In other words, various tasks forced the NNSs 
to modify their output. It is not clear, however, to what extent 
actual learning took place. The modifications in the output may 
have resulted from an allocation of attentional resources that 
allowed the speaker to concentrate on a specific (sometimes form- 
related) aspect of the language. In addition, Pica et al. (1989) 
concluded that:
although NS confirmation requests were not as conducive 
to modification of output as NS clarification requests, we 
would not want to imply that they have less of a role to play 
in SLA. Because, by definition, confirmation requests 
provide a model to NNS of what the NS believes that NNS 
are trying to say, they may prove to be more important 
than clarification requests in other aspects of SLA, for 
example serving as a source of target language input for 
the learner, (p. 84)
This suggests that they view output as an important instrument 
to elicit specific input from the NSs.
Another study evaluating the output hypothesis is that by 
Nobuyoshi & Ellis (1993). In this small-scale study, they com­
pared 3 experimental participants with 3 control participants. In 
the experimental condition, “focused meaning negotiation,” the 
participants received a clarification request every time they made 
a past tense error. In the control condition, “unfocused meaning 
negotiation,” they received a clarification request only when there 
was a genuine communication problem. In a second session one 
week later, both groups experienced only unfocused meaning 
negotiation. The results showed that 2 experimental participants 
improved their accuracy in the use of the past tense and main­
tained this improvement in the second session. The data from this 
study are more important because the improvements in the 
second testing session occurred in a situation in which the focus 
of the clarification requests was not on form, so here the allocation 
of attentional resources is less likely to be the explanation for the
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findings. This study seems to support the output hypothesis in the 
sense that “pushed output” focused on a specific linguistic aspect 
led to sustained improvement. On the other hand, the size of the 
sample is too small to give this study much weight.
Swain & Lapkin (1995) reported on a study in which they 
looked at adolescent learners’ awareness of gaps in their linguistic 
performance and the way in which the learners dealt with those 
gaps. In this study, a number of Grade 8 students of French in an 
immersion setting had to write an article on ecological problems. 
They were not allowed to use a dictionary and did not get any 
support from the teacher. The researcher sat with the students 
and asked them to think aloud when their behavior suggested that 
there was a problem, for example, when there was a pause or 
correction of text. From the transcripts the researcher selected so- 
called “language related episodes” and analyzed them in depth in 
order to find out what cognitive processes were generated by the 
output problems. The authors defined “language related epi­
sodes” as:
any segment of the protocol in which a learner either spoke 
about a language problem he/she encountered while writ­
ing and solved it either correctly or incorrectly, or simply 
solved it (again, either correctly or incorrectly) without 
having explicitly identified it as a problem, (p. 378)
The study’s outcomes show that the learners did indeed become 
aware of the gaps and applied various strategies to overcome the 
problems. Some of the learners’ evaluations appear to have been 
influenced by whether an utterance sounded right or not and 
whether it made sense or not. Their evaluations led to different 
types of reformulations that reveal different ways of handling the 
problem. To what extent actual learning or acquisition took place 
is not clear. On one hand, the authors pointed out that “it will take 
further research to trace the effect of these cognitive processes on 
learning” (p. 383), but on the other they later stated that “what 
goes on between the first output and the second, we are suggest­
ing, is part of the process of second language learning” (p. 386). 
In his discussion of the output hypothesis, R. Ellis (1994, p.
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284) concluded there is still little hard evidence to support it. 
Nobuyoshi and Ellis (1993) suggested that output may lead to 
better control of features that had already been acquired, but “it 
is not clear whether ‘pushed output’ can result in the acquisition 
of new linguistic features” (R. Ellis, 1994, p. 284), It will not be 
easy to arrive at hard supportive evidence for the output hypoth­
esis if the research does not focus on specific linguistic aspects, as 
in the Nobuyoshi and Ellis study. At the same time, this seems to 
go against one of the crucial aspects of output, which in the 
examples presented by Swain and her colleagues is inherently 
part of interaction and co-construction. In research on output in 
interaction, the focus on “pushed output” of specific aspects 
advocated by Nobuyoshi and Ellis is difficult to achieve.
The three studies discussed above can be interpreted as 
support for the output hypothesis. However, from these studies it 
has not become clear through what psycholinguistic processes 
output might play a role in acquisition. To validate the output 
hypothesis in processing terms requires a language-processing 
model that can account for learners’ output and a learning theory 
that is compatible with the processing model. The production 
model developed by Levelt (1989,1993) is a suitable candidate. It 
is the most comprehensive model available, it has a firm empirical 
basis, and it has been applied successfully for modeling both 
monolingual and bilingual speech production (de Bot, 1992; 
Grosjean, 1995; Poulisse & Bongaerts, 1994).
«
Levelfs Production Model
Levelt (1989, 1993) assumed that lexical processing is just 
another form of information processing generally. Information- 
processing theory aims at modeling and quantifying the informa­
tion people use in various cognitive processes. This view sees the 
brain as a system capable of processing information in a manner 
defined not only by the properties of its subcomponents, such as 
short-term and long-term memory, but also by its peripheral 
systems like the vocal tract or the visual system. Over the years,
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the metaphorical part of the theory has grown into what is 
conventionally called “cognitive science,” but the mathematics 
that went with it originally is no longer an integral part of the 
theory. Information processing as a metaphor lies at the heart of 
most current psycholinguistic theories of language processing 
that aim to model the flow of information in processes of language 
production and perception.
Figure 2. Levelt’s (1993) production model. From Linguistic disor­
ders and pathologies: An international handbook (p. 2), by G. 
Blanken, J. Dittmann, H. Grimm, J. Marshall, and C. Wallesch 
(Eds.), 1993, Berlin: de Gruyter. Copyright 1993 by de Gruyter. 
Reprinted with permission.
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To understand what is happening here in terms of a process­
ing model, some information about such a model may be useful. 
Here I give a brief sketch of the Levelt (1993) model (see Figure 1). 
The backbone of the human language production (and perception) 
system is formed by the relations among three distinct levels of 
representation: the conceptual level, the lemma level, and the 
word form level. In production, the conceptualizer (Levelt’s term) 
formats the communicative intentions in such a way that the 
formulator can handle them.
The conceptualizer’s outputs are so-called “preverbal mes­
sages”: In other words, messages that contain all the information 
necessary to convert meaning into language but that are not 
themselves linguistic. The formulator converts the preverbal 
message into a speech plan (phonetic plan) by selecting the right 
words/lexical units and applying grammatical and phonological 
rules.
Lexical items consist of two parts, the lemma and the mor- 
pho-phonological form or lexeme. The lemma represents the 
lexical entry’s meaning and syntax; the lexeme represents mor­
phological and phonological properties. In production, the formu­
lator activates lexical items by matching the meaning part of the 
lemma with the semantic information in the preverbal message. 
The selection of the lemmas and the relevant syntactic informa­
tion leads to the formation of the surface structure. While the 
surface structure is being formed, the formulator activates and 
encodes the morpho-phonological information belonging to the 
lemma. The phonological encoding provides the input for the 
articulator in the form of a phonetic plan. In this article, I assume 
that concepts, lemmas, and word forms are central to various 
forms of language use: productive and receptive, written and 
spoken. Obviously, there are differences between modalities, in 
particular with respect to time and memory constraints.
Here I will limit discussion of the Levelt (1989,1993) model 
to the lexical part. As I mentioned earlier, three levels are 
particularly relevant. At the conceptual level, all information 
about a concept is stored. This includes, for instance, that a
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“horse” has four legs, that it can jump and pull carts, but also how 
it smells and how its neighing sounds. At the lemma level, the 
semantic information needed for a match with the conceptual and 
the syntactic information needed to arrive at a surface structure 
of the sentence are both stored. The lemma can be said to link 
meaning and form. The morphophonological information is stored 
at the lexeme level. There are separate stores for concepts, 
lemmas, and lexemes.
Lexical Items: “Tuer” versus “Mourir”
To show how learners5 lexical knowledge can be described in 
terms of the production model, I will discuss Example 1 (from 
Swain & Lapkin, 1995) in some detail. Example 1 reads as follows:
[S17 has written an article about how phosphates released 
into lakes and oceans cause plants in them to grow quickly 
to such an enormous size that they will kill all the fish. She 
struggles in the following think-aloud episode with how to 
say “kill all the fish”.]
...et mort [and dies]. 1 don’t know. I don’t know because 
mour . . , mourir les poissons [to die the fish], it’s like 
mourir is something that you do. It’s not something that 
someone does to you. So it’s more like they’re being 
murdered and not dying, So, uhm, et tue toutes les poissons 
[and kills all the fish], or something like that.
(Swain & Lapkin, 1995, p. 378)
In their discussion of this example, Swain and Lapkin suggested 
two possible processes elucidated by this verbal report: Either the 
learner applies generalized knowledge in a new context or
she is struggling consciously for the first time with the 
concept as she senses the difference in meaning between 
the two verbs. ... If the latter then what she would seem 
to be doing is working out, on-line, a sophisticated linguis­
tic rule based on a difference she senses in the meaning of 
the two verbs, (pp. 378-379)
In Example 1 the learner intends to say something that 
includes the semantic elements cause and die. These intentions
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Table 1 
Lemma Tuer
Conceptual specification: CAUSE (X (“DIE” Y))
Conceptual arguments: (X,Y)
Syntactic category: V 
Grammatical functions: (SUBJ, DO)
Lexical pointer: 245
Diacritic parameters: tense, aspect, mood, person, number, pitch accent
are part of the preverbal message, and the formulator has to 
match these semantic characteristics with a lemma. The lemma 
looked for is part of the lexical item tuer and contains the 
information in Table 1 (following the lemma format in Levelt, 
1989, p. 191). The conceptual specification indicated that an 
entity X causes an entity Y to die. This is of course a simplified 
representation of the full specification needed to identify a given 
lexical item. The syntactic category indicates that the lexical item 
is a verb and the grammatical functions indicate that the entities 
X  and Y will be subject and direct object. The lexical pointer is an 
address in the store of lexemes. This address contains several 
word forms, all inflections of tuer, such as, tuer, tué, tuerons. 
Which form is selected depends on the diacritic parameters in the 
lemma.
Other candidates share semantic features with this item. 
One such candidate is the lexical item mourir. This lemma 
contains the information shown in Table 2. The formulator tries 
to match a chunk from the preverbal message with a lemma
Table 2 
Lemma Mourir
Conceptual specification: X (“DIE”)
Conceptual arguments: (X)
Syntactic category: V 
Grammatical functions: (SUBJ)
Lexical pointer: 687
Diacritic parameters: tense, aspect, mood, person, number, pitch accent
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2a. Golden retriever
2b. Animal
2d. Large dog
2e. Golden retriever 
Figure 2. The selection of forms using “sieves.”
containing the semantic characteristics cause and die and, accord­
ingly, containing the argument structure (XY). The task for the 
formulator is to come up with the best match. How this matching 
takes place, and what criteria decide when a match is good 
enough, is unclear. The following metaphor may approximate 
what happens: The lexicon (more precisely: the collection of 
lemmas) is like a container with items of different shapes. If we 
want to select an item with a specific form, we can use a sieve with 
exactly that form, but it may be more efficient to make some sort 
of preselection. Figure 2 presents the selection process: 2a is the 
form to be selected, and 2b, 2c, and 2d are three preselecting 
sieves, that is, all forms sharing certain characteristics pass 
through those sieves. In this case, 2e is the final sieve for the form 
to be selected. The selection of items takes place by applying a 
series of sieves that have a specific form.
For the selection of lexical items, a similar process takes 
place: The formulator tries to match parts of the preverbal 
message with the meaning characteristics of lemmas and the
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selection will be increasingly specific. The shapes of the sieves can 
be compared with meaning components; the selection of the name 
of a specific type of dog can go from animal to canine to Golden 
Retriever . The communicative setting defines how specific a 
lexical item has to be; in some situations it can suffice to label an 
entity as animal or nonhuman , whereas another setting requires 
a specific reference.
There is a structure within the store of lemmas, based on 
frequency of use and recency of access (among other things), which 
leads to differences in accessibility of items. More frequent items 
and items that have been used recently will be more readily 
available. For most lemmas, this series of sieves will lead to the 
selection of the right item. This selection of items proceeds at a 
very high rate: In normal speech production 5 items a second is not 
unusual. There is thus considerable pressure on the system to 
deliver the items rapidly. In some cases, no item will pass through 
the last sieve, which means that no perfect match is possible. For 
example, English has no single lexical item that expresses killing  
someone with the a id  of a stereo amplifier (or an equivalent of the 
Dutch verb ijsberen, which means walking up a n d  down while 
th ink ing ). If there is no real match, there are two possibilities: 
Either one of the items that passed through the previous sieve will 
be selected because it is the next best match for this item, or a 
message is passed on to the conceptualizer pointing out that this 
chunking of the preverbal message cannot be handled with exist­
ing lexical items and that therefore the preverbal message has to 
be revised. This happens in the following example:
P eu t-ê tre  ils so n t  t r o p , (Maybe they are too) uhm, lazy, lazy, 
lazy, lazy, uhm, £rop. I’m thinking of lazy. Ils., .no. I don’t 
know how to write lazy and Til never be able to figure out 
so I have to change the structure of the sentence so I can 
write something else instead of lazy.
(Swain & Lapkin, 1995, p. 382)
This is a particularly interesting example because it shows that 
after a given number of trials the system decides that it will not 
be able to find the target item, and feeds this information back to
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the conceptualizer, who then has to come up with a different 
phrasing in which the French word for lazy does not appear.
Following the selection of a lexical item through the lemma, 
two things happen in parallel: First, various categorical proce­
dures begin that will lead to the development of a basic syntactic 
structure—the argument structure, activation of an S-structure, 
selection of candidates for various syntactic roles, and the devel­
opment of Y-, N-, A- or P-phrases. Second, the lexical pointer 
selects a word form from the collection of lexemes. The nature of 
the relation between lemma and lexeme is not quite clear. In 
principle, there is a one-to-one relation between the two—that is, 
the lexical pointer refers to a unique address in the word form 
store. However, there is some evidence that the selection of a 
given lemma will not always lead to the selection of the right word 
form. This becomes apparent in the “tip-of-the-tongue” phenom­
enon, where speakers cannot find the right word form although 
they know that they know it. Research on this phenomenon 
reveals that speakers retrieve the information on word forms by 
using different aspects of form; in particular, the initial sound and 
the number of syllables of the word to be found are more easily 
available than the rest of the form information (see Jones & 
Langford, 1987, for a more extensive discussion). A recent study 
by Meyer and Bock (1992) showed that when participants were 
presented with a definition of a word followed by a cue word that 
was related either in meaning or in sound, both types of cues 
helped rather than hindered lexical retrieval. This seems to 
suggest that the retrieval of a word is a two-step process: First the 
lemma must be activated, and then the lexeme.
The word form that has been selected will now be integrated 
into the syntactic structure of the sentence, and the ensuing 
surface structure will go both to the articulator and an internal 
feedback loop that feeds into the conceptualizer. This monitoring 
only works as an external feedback loop; it cannot influence the 
construction process within the formulator. As a consequence, 
most error corrections are not corrections of specific errors but 
simply retries of the same utterance.
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Let us now return to the example we started with. This 
participant’s preverbal message contains a chunk with the con­
ceptual information cause and die; she tries to match this with a 
lemma, The first run leads to the selection of m ourir , apparently 
the best choice available. In the think-aloud protocol, she de­
scribes her evaluation of this outcome. This description reveals 
that she noticed a mismatch between the information in the 
preverbal message (cause + die) and the item selected (die)} which 
in the feedback loop is translated back into conceptual terms to 
allow for a comparison in the monitor. The description shows that 
the participant noticed a mismatch in terms of the conceptual 
argument structure and accordingly in the conceptual specifica­
tion.
«
The Dime in the Piggy Bank Model
With respect to the output hypothesis, the crucial question is 
whether this kind of talking to oneself in any sense reveals 
learning. I will argue that lexical access is a completely autono­
mous and automatic process not amenable to external manipula­
tion. F ollowing the basic logic of the model, which works in terms 
of “if-then” operations {if the following operations have been 
carried out, then move to the next step, or if  a sufficient match has 
been found, then select this item), no external operations can 
influence the selection process. In other words: You cannot talk 
yourself into finding the right word. An analogy may help to 
clarify this point. A possible model of lexical access is the “Dime 
in the Piggy Bank” model. There is a dime in the piggy bank, and 
you want to get it out now. First you hold the bank upside down 
and hope the dime will fall out, which in most cases will happen. 
Sometimes it will not come out. You can shake the piggy, hold it 
at a different angle, poke into it with a Swiss army knife, but all 
the actions hardly ever have any effect. After all that, you happen 
to turn the piggy upside down again, and out falls the dime. Why 
it did not come out the first time remains a mystery forever.
What seems to be going on with S17?s processing is the
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following: She selected a lexical item and noticed that it was not 
fully correct. Then, asked to talk about this monitoring activity, 
after a while she came up with the right word. There is no evidence 
in what she said that the verbalization of the monitoring process 
was a significant part of this “improvement.” Talking about the 
argument structure merely gave her more time to try and try again 
to find the right word. At “So, uhm” the dime comes out: She finds 
the right word. The most likely explanation is that the think-aloud 
activity took her attention away from the (wrong) word that kept 
popping up, because it was activated recently. Some experimental 
research supports this interpretation. Experiments using the 
picture-word interference task, in which people have to name a 
picture presented along with a word semantically and/or ortho- 
graphically related to the target word, show that semantically 
related words lead to longer naming latencies but orthographically 
related words lead to shorter naming latencies (La Heij, 1988). 
The semantically related word apparently activates a closely 
related lexical item that competes with the target item. In other 
words: Giving additional semantic information does not necessar­
ily lead to easier access, and may even lead to access problems, The 
data from Meyer and Bock (1992) mentioned earlier suggest that 
form priming may have some effect on retrieval, but there is no 
evidence that talking to oneself (“I know this word begins with an 
s.”) can be regarded as form priming in that sense.
Additional support for the position taken here comes from a 
study by Ammerlaan (1996), who looked at Dutch migrants in 
Australia who had not used their first language for 10 years or 
more. These “dormant” bilinguals had to name pictures (pre­
sented on a computer screen) in Dutch. The informants had great 
difficulty in accessing the words from the language they had not 
used for so long. The transcriptions of their attempts to arrive at 
the names of the pictures reveal that they used all sorts of 
strategies to gain time, but their talking did not seem to bring 
them closer to the word form for which they were looking. In the 
following example the informant was presented with a picture of 
a peanut (Dutch: pirtda):
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Pinda/Peanut: . . er . .. peanut. . er noten erm are nuts, 
but peanoten, no, I don’t know . . .  we used to buy them at 
the market, de markt, op de markt, and we used to buy 
those peanut, but I can’t think, and take them home. One 
of the things I remembered as a child . . . and we used to 
crack them at home, a little treat we had . .
(Ammerlaan, 1996, p. 239)
This example shows that, despite a considerable amount of se­
mantic and episodic information, the word form still could not be 
found, although there can be no doubt that in the past this word 
had been used frequently.
A recent study, by Paribakht and Wesche (personal commu­
nication, March 1994) of the University of Ottawa collected 
introspective data from adult ESL students with a variety of 
backgrounds. The students had to read a passage in English and 
summarize it. They also had to indicate what lexical problems 
they had encountered in that passage. The participants showed 
signs of the Dime in the Piggy Bank phenomenon, which is 
essentially a special version of the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon: 
In the former a word form is looking for a lemma, whereas in the 
latter a lemma is looking for a word form. One person could not 
find the meaning of a word and tried to gain time:
I was repeating because I wasn’t sure the meaning of the 
word bleak, so I keep repeating, repeating, to see if, to see 
if it sounded familiar because it’s a word that sounds 
familiar. So I kept repeating. (Paribakht & Wesche,
personal communication, March 1994)
In other words, this student knew that, given time, he could come 
up with the right meaning. By repeating, he hoped the word form 
would “find” its appropriate lemma.
Both word (form) finding difficulties in production and word 
(meaning) finding problems in perception are caused by problems 
in the lemma/word form connection. In principle, these problems 
do not really differ from LI to L2, but problems with finding word 
meanings seem to occur more frequently in L2 than in LI.
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Learning: The Acquisition of Declarative 
and Procedural Knowledge
To find the locus of learning through output requires discuss­
ing learning in terms of a theory that fits with the information- 
processing approach on which the Levelt (1989, 1993) model is 
based. Within the framework of processing described above, I 
define language acquisition as the acquisition of declarative and 
procedural knowledge. Here I follow the information-processing 
approach to skill acquisition proposed by Anderson (1982). (See 
also Towell, Hawkins, & Bazergui, 1996, for a discussion on the 
development of fluency using the Levelt and Anderson frame­
works.) Following Hulstijn’s (1990) description of this approach, 
one can distinguish between controlled information processing 
and automatic information processing. Learning implies the 
development from controlled processing to automatic processing. 
The acquisition of cognitive skills has two stages, a declarative 
stage and a procedural stage. In the declarative stage, learners 
acquire isolated facts and rules that can be applied in specific 
cognitive tasks. Through frequent use, these facts and rules get 
formalized and become procedures. Declarative-stage processing 
is slow and more or less open to conscious manipulation. However, 
procedural-stage processing is fast and beyond conscious control. 
Proceduralization takes place with increasingly larger units of 
information, leading to automatic processing of these units. Pro­
cedures do not develop in a linear fashion, but undergo constant 
tuning and restructuring.
Distribution of attention plays an important role in skill 
acquisition. In controlled processing and in the declarative stage, 
much attention is allotted to fairly simple, lower-level processing. 
When knowledge becomes more automatic and proceduralized, 
much less attention is spent on lower-level skills, and more 
attention goes to higher-level skills. For example, an incipient 
language learner will pay much attention to articulation, but a 
more advanced learner uses higher-level procedures and pays 
more attention to pragmatic aspects.
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Various elements of a language to be learned may be in 
different stages: It is not the whole language as a system that goes 
from the declarative stage into the procedural stage. Tuning and 
restructuring take place on the basis of a mismatch between 
declarative and procedural knowledge in (various parts of) the 
system and input. As Hulstijn (1990, p. 33) pointed out, first 
language acquisition is basically coordination of comprehension 
and production: On the basis of input, the child develops a system  
of rules that is adapted constantly. Production lags behind 
comprehension, and the development of productive skills is based 
on a mismatch between what is said and the internal norm, or, to 
use Hulstijn’s words: “The impetus for such language change (the 
fact that the children’s first language acquisition does not halt) is 
provided by their detection of the mismatch between what they 
can understand and what they can say themselves” (p. 33).
A full treatment of Anderson’s (1982) model is beyond the 
scope of this article. For the discussion of learning on the basis of 
output, Anderson’s main points are the development from con­
trolled processing to automatic processing, the distinction be­
tween declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge, and the 
role of attention in skill acquisition.
Learning and Output
On the basis of what it means to know a word in production 
and perception, one can describe what types of knowledge the 
learner must acquire. In production one can distinguish the 
following steps: the conceptual framing of a communicative inten­
tion in a preverbal message, the matching of chunks of this 
preverbal message with lemmas in the lexicon, the activation of 
grammatical procedures, the activation of word forms and the 
formation of a surface structure. The next steps in production, 
which deal with the generation of a phonetic plan and the execu­
tion of articulation, I will not discuss here. When dealing with 
language learners who have acquired their first language to a 
considerable extent at this age, one can assume that in principle
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the production system is available and that the generation of 
communicative intentions, which precedes language indepen­
dently, poses no problems. This means that the learning will have 
to do with the remaining steps in the process.
Table 2 presented the information in the lemma. The 
information in the lemma is of a declarative nature, but its 
function is to trigger various sorts of procedural knowledge in the 
system. This means that the learner has to acquire the declara­
tive knowledge, or link existing knowledge toit (e.g., that“action”- 
type lemmas will generally be verbs), and acquire the procedures 
on which knowledge will work. It is very unlikely that an L2- 
learner will acquire all procedures completely from scratch. Con­
ceivably, speakers have a stock of procedures at their disposal 
that may not be language-specific. For example, the procedure for 
the placement of adjectives in NPs is to a large extent similar for 
English, German, and Dutch; however, the rules for adverbial 
placement are similar for German and Dutch, but different for 
English. In other words, speakers of more than one language have 
an extensive set of procedures at their disposal. Depending on the 
language they are using, they apply a subset of these procedures 
in language production. This does not differ much from how 
lexical items are organized in a bi- or multilingual speaker (see de 
Bot & Schreuder, 1993, for a discussion).
One of the main learning tasks, in particular when learning 
a cognate language, is to find out what procedures apply in the 
language to be learned. Parts of the information in the lemma 
may be learned fairly easily by analogy: The number and types of 
grammatical function are limited for most pairs of Indo-European 
languages. An English child learning French does not learn 
anything completely new when finding out that a particular verb 
has two grammatical functions: SUBJ and DO, because English 
has many transitive verbs as well. For leaiming less cognate 
languages, in particular ergative languages, this is not the case, 
of course.
Some LI rules can be used in L2 as they are; others may need 
to be adapted; some L2 rules are so different from anything in LI
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that they have to be learned from scratch. Both in the adaptation 
of existing rules and in the acquisition of new rules the learner 
must acquire new declarative knowledge. For example, acquisi­
tion of the French subjunctive by speakers of Dutch implies both 
the acquisition of the inflectional paradigm (which starts as 
declarative knowledge in the morphosyntactical system) and the 
acquisition of diacritic parameters for certain verbs and function 
words. In the course of time, with use, the slow processing on the 
basis of declarative knowledge turns into fast and automatic 
procedures. How quickly this transition takes place depends on 
various factors: amount of difference from the LI (or existing L2) 
procedures, frequency of use, type of evidence in the input, and 
maybe amount and quality of output.
To return to the main question: To what extent and how does 
output play a role in acquisition? Output as such does not play a 
role in the acquisition of completely new declarative knowledge, 
because learners can only acquire this type of knowledge by using 
external input. Thus, the locus of the effect of output must be in the 
transition o f  declarative to procedural knowledge. Specific infor­
mation in the lemma activates certain procedures, and the system 
does not get error messages about the result of this connection; 
hence the strength of this connection increases. When this 
connection is made repeatedly, the activity becomes automated, 
and therefore more rapid and more precise. The control mecha­
nism for this connection is formed by the speaker’s receptive 
knowledge about the use of specific rules and elements. If what is 
produced and what is correct do not match according to the 
internal norm, negative feedback will hamper the development of 
the connection. This is in fact how one of the roles of output, 
noticing, works.
A crucial point is whether making the right connection on 
one’s own is more effective for learning than hearing this connec­
tion being made in the input. I assume that actively making this 
particular trace in memory is more effective than merely perceiv­
ing it. The explanation probably lies in the amount of attention 
invested: Attention can be viewed as a limited set of mental
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resources that have to be shared by various processing activities. 
Selective attention is important in learning. Probably, focused 
attention to specific production processes stimulates the develop­
ment of connections in memory. In language production by NSs, 
most attention goes to higher processes, such as the coordination 
of intentions; lower, automatic processes on the morphosyntactic 
and phonological/articulatory level receive hardly any attention. 
If the communicative intention and the form and content of the 
message do not match, the speaker will, depending on the commu­
nicative situation, allocate attentional resources to the source of 
the mismatch. If there is a form problem, the speaker can pay 
attention temporarily to form, for example, to morphology.
Returning to the lexical problem evidenced by Swain and 
Lapkin’s (1995) S17: Is there any learning because there is output? 
I argued above that the comments made by S17 on the argument 
structure of the intended lexical item as such do not reveal any 
learning, except possibly in terms of articulating the difference
between kill and die. Following the line of argument set out above,
the finding of the right lexical item may involve learning: The 
participant made a connection between a lemma and a matching 
word form. Because she made this connection, and because no error 
messages on the connection occurred, the connection was strength­
ened, and will be made more easily and/or more quickly next time.
Finally, to what extent can the system itself generate new 
knowledge independent of input? As pointed out earlier, this 
depends on the definition of acquisition. When new words are 
formed through the application of existing rules or the combina­
tion of morphemes previously acquired, this can be interpreted as 
acquisition. Also, these newly formed elements can move from a 
declarative phase to a procedural phase.
A Reassessment of the Functions of Output
1. Noticing. According to Swain & Lapkin (1995), “one 
function of output in second language learning might be to force 
the learner to move from the semantic processing prevalent in
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comprehension to the syntactic processing needed for production” 
(p. 375). Although it is not clear how there can be comprehension 
without syntactic analysis, clearly in production learners are “on 
their own.” They cannot rely on external cues and general 
nonlinguistic knowledge in the same way they do in comprehen­
sion, To produce, they need to be more active: They need to create 
communicative intentions and express them in linguistic forms; 
in doing so, they discover what they actually can and cannot do. 
Noticing a problem is not solving it, but the awareness of a 
problem may lead to more attention to relevant information in the 
input, given incentives to solve the problem. In most of the 
communicative tasks discussed by Swain (1995), the learners had 
good reasons to solve the problems encountered (e.g., students 
had to work in pairs to reconstruct a piece of text). Thus, noticing 
can lead to learning; it may help the learner make use of relevant 
information in the input; or it may stimulate the learner to fill 
gaps in other ways (e.g., by looking in a dictionary).
2. Hypothesis testing. There is little doubt that output serves 
to test hypotheses. The production model discussed here distin­
guishes between internal speech and external speech: The pho­
netic plan generated by the formulator is fed back into the speech- 
comprehension system to monitor the internal speech. Research 
using verbal reports has shown that learners generate internal 
speech and evaluate it internally before articulating it. The 
speech-comprehension system serves to monitor internal speech 
with respect to both form and content. Receptive knowledge is 
more stable and reliable than productive knowledge. In this 
sense, internal speech serves to test hypotheses against internal 
standards; on this basis, improved patterns of language use will 
develop. Output clearly serves to enhance productive knowledge 
and procedures to the level of the receptive knowledge. The 
external speech also may play a role in this type of hypothesis 
testing. If the internal feedback loops function appropriately, the 
external speech will present the best product available. Clearly, 
the feedback loop will not filter out all the errors it could, because 
it lacks time for corrections and retries. Assuming that for a given
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sentence the external speech passes (i.e., it contains no errors 
according to the internal standards), the learner may still be 
aware that the utterances contain various dubious elements. (Not 
inconceivably, language learners label linguistic elements for 
“uncertainty” ranging from “this is probably wrong, but let’s try it” 
to “I am absolutely sure that this is correct.”) Two reasons may lie 
behind the use of “uncertain” linguistic means: There are no other 
means available to express this communicative intention, and/or 
the learner wants to try out whether it works. On the basis of the 
reactions to the message, the learner can estimate the appropri­
ateness of the means. Depending on the situation, the feedback 
may be form- or meaning-related. Again, output functions to get 
specific input to adapt existing knowledge.
3. Talking about language: The metalinguistic function. The 
metalinguistic function involves using output to talk about lan­
guage. In their work, Swain and her colleagues (Swain, 1995; 
Swain & Lapkin, 1995) have developed various classroom activi­
ties in which (pairs of) students have to work together to solve 
“form-based” problems in the target language. Through discus­
sion, the students become more aware of the problem and try to 
solve it together. For this function, the elicitation of relevant 
input seems to be the mechanism through which learning can take 
place. Because they share the same (lack of) knowledge, learners 
working in pairs can perhaps understand the core of each other’s 
specific problems.
4. Enhancing fluency. I attempted to show how output 
enhances fluency. As will be clear from the description of the 
model used, enhancing fluency is one of the most crucial cognitive 
activities in learning. This means much more than just increased 
speed of delivery. Fluency serves as an index of automaticity of 
processing. Fluency on one level allows attentional resources to 
be spent on higher-level processes.
Summary and Implications
This article treats the output hypothesis from a psycho-
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linguistic perspective. I conclude that output serves an important 
role in SLA, in particular because it generates highly specific 
input that the language-processing system needs to build up a 
coherent set of knowledge. Output also plays a direct role in 
enhancing fluency by turning declarative knowledge into proce­
dural knowledge. Output also can play an indirect role in the 
acquisition of declarative knowledge by triggering input that the 
learner can use for the generation of new declarative knowledge.
The output hypothesis in its present form is an important 
improvement over studies that have looked solely at quantity of 
output as the main factor. Looking at output can explain a lot 
about how learners find out the subtleties of the target language. 
Contrary to Krashen’s (1994) interpretation, which seems to have 
missed the essence of the comprehensible output hypothesis 
completely, it is not quantity of output that counts. What matters 
is the quality  of information made available through output.
A final word on paradigms. In her discussion of the functions 
of output, Swain (1995) proposed a Vygotskian perspective on 
language learning:
According to Vygotksy, cognitive processes arise from the 
interaction that occurs between individuals. That is, 
cognitive development, including presumably language 
development, originates on the interpsychological plane. 
Through a process of appropriation, what originated in the 
social sphere comes to be represented intrapsychologically, 
that is, within the individual, (p. 135)
This perspective differs somewhat from the information-process­
ing perspective central to the discussion here. Notions from these 
two paradigms do not fit together well. From the information- 
processing viewpoint, the idea of interpsychological learning 
smacks of unfounded assumptions on the transmission of infor­
mation (not unlike the early Phlogiston theory on the transmis­
sion of heat; see Grant, 1981, p. 109, for a discussion of that 
theory). But co-construction, rather than transmission, of infor­
mation is taking place. From a Vygotskian perspective, the 
information-processing approach presents a mechanistic and re-
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ductionist view on mental processes, missing crucial aspects—in 
particular that the exchange of information is essentially interac­
tion-based.
Which perspective one holds true probably depends more on 
belief and personal preferences than on anything empirically 
testable. Trying to falsify hypotheses from one paradigm in terms 
of the other paradigm is a futile exercise. However, as I have tried 
to show, trying to understand a phenomenon like SLA by looking 
at it from different perspectives may enrich the field.
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